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Abstract 
In view of the demographic trends, most EU countries face the problem of 
a declining work force in the future. Understanding the interaction between 
income support systems (such as unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance, 
early  retirement  and  pension  systems)  and  total  labor  supply  is  of  crucial 
importance to combat problems and ensure economic growth in the future. 
The German labor market has been plagued by high and persistent unem­
ployment in the last two decades in combination with a relatively low labor 
force participation of women. This created a situation where labor market 
reforms were unavoidable. The speed and depth of the reforms are remark­
able, mainly aimed at activating people by increasing their incentives to take 
up work. The aim of this paper is to give a brief overview of the German 
income support systems and labor market polices, their recent reforms and— 
where already possible—eﬀects of these reforms. Overall, Germany seems to 
be on the right track. The recent reforms helped to tackle some labor market 
problems but also created high political unrest. It remains to be seen how 
future governments react to worsened economic conditions in light of these 
experiences. 
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 1  Introduction 
The European Union (EU) currently suﬀers from a recession which results in an 
increase of long-term unemployment in most countries. In terms of demographic 
trends, however, a major problem of the EU is the declining number of people in 
working  age.  Early  retirement  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  that  there  are  consid­
erably less people in the work force than actually might be available, i.e., those 
of working age and capable of work. These non-employed are either unemployed or 
economically inactive. In this context, economically inactive is deﬁned as neither be­
ing employed nor looking for a job.1 Understanding the interaction between income 
support systems (such as unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance, early retirement 
and pension systems) and total labor supply is of crucial importance to combat 
potential problems and ensure economic growth in the future. 
Independently of the current recession, the German labor market has been plagued 
by high and persistent unemployment in the last two decades. Since the end of the 
seventies, unemployment rates increased steadily and since the reuniﬁcation in 1990 
the unemployment rate rose from 7.3% to 13.0% in 2005; the situation in East Ger­
many being especially troublesome with an unemployment rate of 20.6% in 2005. 
Taken together with a relatively low female labor force participation, this created a 
situation where labor market reforms have been unavoidable. These reforms were ini­
tiated in 2001/2002 and the speed and depth of the reforms is quite remarkable. This 
is especially true when one keeps in mind that the German welfare state has been 
typically depicted as the prime example of the conservative welfare regime and being 
a “frozen welfare state” highly resistant to change (see, inter alia, Esping-Andersem, 
1990; Manow and Seils, 2000; Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2005; Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, 
and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). 
The  reforms  touched  the  core  elements  of  the  labor  market,  including  active 
and passive labor market policies, the organizational structure of the labor oﬃces 
as well as the pension system. As a general goal, the reforms aimed at activating 
people by increasing their incentives to take up work. Additional eﬀorts have been 
made to increase the labor force participation of young families. The aim of this 
paper is to give a brief overview of the German income support systems and labor 
market  policies,  their  recent  reforms  and—where  already  possible—the  eﬀects  of 
these reforms. The report is organized in the following way: in Section 2, we will 
discuss the employment and inactivity trends in Germany in light of the general 
1See the report by Alphametrics/Applica (2009) for details. 
2
 2 
trends in the EU. Section 3 will describe the various relevant income support systems 
in Germany and outline the most recent reforms. In Section 4 we will summarize the 
already available evidence on the eﬀects of these reforms before Section 5 concludes. 
Trends in Inactivity and Employment: Germany 
in the EU 
Based on the report by Alphametrics/Applica (2009) we discuss the most recent 
trends in inactivity and employment in Germany (in relation to the development 
in the EU). In 2008, around 66% of people in the working age (15 to 64 years) 
were employed in the EU-27, 29% were classiﬁed as economically inactive and 5% 
as unemployed (see Table 1).2  In Germany, the overall employment (71%) and un­
employment (6%) rates are slightly higher and correspondingly the share of inactive 
people is lower at 23%. There are substantial gender diﬀerences, with an inactivity 
rate of 18% for men and 29% for women. The share of inactive females in the prime 
working age (25-49 years) is roughly 20% in Germany which is slightly higher than 
in the EU. One of the reforms we will discuss later on—the parental leave beneﬁt 
(PLB, Elterngeld)—was designed in order to tackle this problem. Any tendency to­
wards early retirement can be explored in more detail by examining developments 
in non-employment rates among older workers. In 2008, the non-employment rate 
added up to 70 % for those aged 60-64 in the EU as a whole. In recent years, however, 
a common tendency towards a decline of the non-employment rate was observed for 
the EU-15 member states. Among individuals aged 55-59, the non-employment rate 
has declined from 48% in 2000 to 41% in 2008, while it has been a stronger decrease 
for women than for men (Alphametrics/Applica, 2009). In Germany, the share of 
inactive males and females in the age group 55-59 is substantially lower at 31%. This 
is also true for individuals aged 60-64 where the non-employment rate in Germany 
is only 65% compared to 70% in the EU. The German non-employment rate in this 
age group is also declining in most recent years which can be seen as a reaction to 
the eﬀorts to raise the actual retirement age which we will discuss in Section 3.2. 
2The employment rate is taken from the EU Labor Force Survey and is calculated by dividing 
the  number  of  persons  aged  15  to  64  in  employment  by  the  total  population  of  the  same  age 
group. The survey covers the entire population living in private households and excludes those 
in collective households such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. The employed 
population consists of those persons who—during the reference week—did any work for pay or 
proﬁt for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily 
absent. 
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 Table 1: Trends in Inactivity and Employment: Selected Statistics for Germany and 
the EU (in%) 
Statistic  Germany  EU-27 
Total  Men  Women  Total  Men  Women 
Activity status (15-64) in 2008 
Employed  70.7  75.9  65.4  65.9  72.8  59.1 
Unemployed  5.8  6.2  5.4  5.0  5.2  4.8 
Inactive  23.5  17.9  29.2  29.9  22.0  36.1 
Non-employment  rates  of  men  and 
women by age (2008) 
15-64  29.3  24.1  34.6  34.1  27.2  40.9 
55-59  31.1  23.3  38.6  41.0  31.3  50.2 
60-64  64.9  56.7  72.7  69.8  61.1  77.9 
Activity rates by highest education level 
attained in 2008 (25-64) 
High education (ISCED level 5-6) 
Employment rate  86.6  89.5  82.7  85.3  89  81.8 
Unemployment rate  3.2  2.9  3.8  3.4  3.0  3.9 
Inactivity rate  10.2  7.8  14.1  11.7  8.3  15.0 
Medium Education (ISCED level 3-4) 
Employment rate  76.1  81.1  71.2  74.9  81.5  67.9 
Unemployment rate  7.1  7.1  7.1  5.6  5.0  6.3 
Inactivity rate  18.1  12.6  23.4  20.6  14.1  27.5 
Low Education (ISCED level 0-2) 
Employment rate  55.6  66.5  48.2  56.6  69.8  44.6 
Unemployment rate  16.2  17.8  14.7  9.8  9.0  10.8 
Inactivity rate  28.3  15.7  37.1  33.6  21.2  44.6 
Reasons for not working among men and 
women aged 15-64 (2007) 
of own illness or disability  8.1  9.9  7.1  13.0  16.8  10.7 
of other personal or family responsibilities  18.8  1.3  29.5  17.8  2.2  27.3 
of education or training  38.5  51.7  30.4  31.2  40.5  25.5 
of retirement  25.6  31.2  22.2  21.6  26.5  18.6 
of belief that no work is available  1.1  0.9  1.3  4.0  3.7  4.1 
of other reasons  7.9  5.0  9.6  12.1  9.9  13.5 
Source: Eurostat, LFS and Alphametrics/Applica (2009) 
Due to the association between education and employment prospects, we will also 
look at the inactivity levels diﬀerentiated by educational attainment. In the EU-27, 
a disproportionate high number of economically inactive individuals have relatively 
low education levels; which is especially true for women. In 2008, 46% of all econom­
ically inactive people (aged 25-64) in the EU had no educational qualiﬁcation above 
basic schooling, i.e., education above level 2 of the International Standard Classiﬁca­
tion of Education (ISCED), which in turn corresponds to lower secondary education 
(6 years in nearly all EU member states). Table 1 also shows unemployment rates 
by education level. Whereas the unemployment rate is nearly 10% for individuals 
with low education (ISCED level 0-2), it is only 6% for individuals with medium 
education (ISCED level 3-4) and even only 3.4% for high-skilled individuals (ISCED 
level 5-6). These ﬁgures are quite diﬀerent for Germany: the unemployment rate for 
individuals with low education is 16% and therefore ﬁve times larger compared to 
highly educated individuals (3.2%). Hence, low educated people in Germany face a 
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much higher risk of joblessness than in other European countries. Therefore, some of 
the recent labor market reforms explicitly aim to increase labor force participation 
of lower educated individuals, e.g., by subsidizing social security contributions. We 
will discuss this in more detail in Section 3.3. 
The Europan LFS also provides insights about the reasons why men and women 
across the EU are economically inactive. To be more speciﬁc: those who are neither 
employed nor unemployed in the reference week are asked to indicate the main rea­
son for their inactivity status. A signiﬁcant share of working age individuals were 
inactive because of being in education or training (31%). Another relatively large 
share was inactive due to early retirement (22%). Both shares are higher in Germany 
where 39% of the individuals aged 15-64 years state education as the main reason. 
This is due to the comparatively long schooling and vocational education system in 
Germany. But also early retirement is reported by 26%. We will discuss the implica­
tions of this development for the pension system in Section 3.2. It is also interesting 
to look at individuals aged 25-49 years stating that family responsibilities kept them 
inactive (Alphametrics/Applica, 2009). Once again, Germany is an outlier with 53% 
of all inactive individuals in this age group and 67% of women reporting this as the 
main reason. The EU averages are 44% and 57% and for females in Denmark and 
Sweden the shares are even only 10% and 13%. Clearly, one of the reasons for the 
disproportional rate in Germany is the problematic child-care situation. On aver­
age, child-care facilities allowing parents to work full-time exist only for 8% of the 
children under three years. We will discuss one initiative to overcome this in Section 
3.4. Another possible reason lies in the current tax and social welfare legislation 
which favors the single male bread-winner model. We will brieﬂy address this issue 
in Section 3.5. 
Institutional Setting and Recent Reforms in Ger­
many 
In this section we will discuss the three most relevant income support systems in 
Germany. We will start with unemployment beneﬁts and social assistance in Section 
3.1 before we move on to pensions and sickness/disability insurance in Section 3.2. 
Since the most recent labor market reforms also changed active labor market policies 
towards an emphasis on activation measures, we will discuss these issues brieﬂy, too, 
in Section 3.3. The new parental leave beneﬁt scheme will be presented in Section 
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 3.4, before we will also address the eﬀects of the German tax system on labor supply 
incentives in Section 3.5. 
Before we do so, we will brieﬂy sketch the political and economic situation leading 
to the labor market reforms in 2002. Many European countries had to face high 
unemployment rates in the 1990s, but Germany has especially proven to be unable 
to beneﬁt from favorable conditions in the global economy. With only 18% the GDP 
growth rate between 1991 and 2003 was only half of the growth rate in the UK 
leading to decreasing employment and increasing unemployment (Jacobi and Kluve, 
2007). Germany’s tardy response to the worsening labor market situation can only 
be explained by a long period of reform blockage and postponement in labor market 
policy adjustments (“Reformstau”, see, e.g., Eichhorst and Marx, 2009). Certainly, 
the reuniﬁcation in 1990 played a major role, where active labor market policies (and 
passive income support systems like early retirement) were used to take “surplus 
labor” out of the labor market. A clear indication of this is that in 1992 the number of 
participants in job creation schemes and training programs exceeded the number of 
unemployed in East Germany. Since deﬁcits in the unemployment insurance schemes 
and  the  budget  of  the  Federal  Employment  Agency  (FEA)  were  covered  by  the 
federal government or higher contributions, this resulted in rising non-wage labor 
costs which in turn hampered employment creation (Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and 
Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). The left-wing coalition in power since 1998 was torn 
between stabilizing the traditional “German social policy” approach and introducing 
the concept of a “activating state” in New Labour style. When the FEA was accused 
of massive fraud in reporting successful job placements in 2002, the government took 
advantage of this scandal and introduced some rather radical changes in German 
labor market policy. An independent expert commission worked out the blueprint 
for the reform package which is known as the Hartz reforms3, consisting of four laws 
(Hartz I-IV ) implemented step by step between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 
2005. This sequence of rather harsh reforms that were perceived as a break with the 
traditional social policy approach to labor market problems provoked broad public 
unrest  (Konle-Seidl,  Eichhorst,  and  Grienberger-Zingerle,  2007).  While  Hartz  IV 
constitutes a dramatic change of the unemployment beneﬁt and social assistance 
schemes, Hartz I-III  addressed the organizational structure of public employment 
services, altered many existing active labor market programs, introduced some new 
schemes, and in general aimed at activating the unemployed and stimulating labor 
3Named after the chairman Peter Hartz who was heading the commission (Bundesministerium 
f¨ ur Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2003) 
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 demand by deregulating the labor market. In the next subsections we will brieﬂy 
discuss the most relevant changes for our research question. 
3.1  Unemployment Beneﬁts and Social Assistance 
A major part of the above mentioned Hartz  reforms  involved the system of un­
employment compensation. Prior to the reforms, Germany had a system of income 
protection which was based on three pillars: 1) unemployment beneﬁts, 2) unem­
ployment assistance and 3) social assistance. We will ﬁrst brieﬂy describe these three 
elements in order to allow for comparisons with the new system. A detailed descrip­
tion of the unemployment insurance system in Germany and its changes over time 
is given in Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle (2007). 
Unemployment beneﬁts (UB, Arbeitslosengeld) provided earnings-related income 
replacement for a limited duration of 6-32 months if the unemployed had been in 
employment covered by social insurance for at least 12 months. The legal basis for 
UB was the Social Code III (SC III, Sozialgesetzbuch III ). The replacement rate of 
UB was dependent on family status, while the duration was dependent on age and 
previous employment duration. Unemployed persons with at least one child were 
entitled  to  67%  of  net  remuneration  and  60%  otherwise.  Unemployment  beneﬁt 
claims were based on an employment record and provided beneﬁts proportional to 
prior earnings within the reference period. Individual means or needs were not taking 
into  account.  The  maximum  duration  of  unemployment  beneﬁts  varied  between 
6  and  32  months  (see  Table  2).  Workers  who  have  been  employed  less  than  12 
months within the last 7 years before entering unemployment were not entitled for 
unemployment beneﬁts whereas with 12 months worked a claim of 6 months was 
generated. The claims rose proportionally to the number of months in employment. 
However, several discontinuities with respect to age existed. For someone aged below 
45 years the maximum entitlement period was 12 months (given that he/she was 
employed for at least 24 months), whereas people above 45 (and below 47) could 
claim up to 18 months. Further discontinuities were built in at 47 years (up to 22 
months), 52 years (up to 26 months) and 57 years (up to 32 months). The beneﬁts 
were funded by employer and employee contributions and administered by the FEA 
which was traditionally also in charge of implementing active labor market policies. 
After the entitlement period of unemployment beneﬁts had expired, unemployed 
individuals  were  eligible  for,  in  principle,  unlimited  and  means-tested  unemploy­
ment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe). These beneﬁts were still earnings-related 
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 Table 2: Maximum Duration of Unemployment Beneﬁt - Before and After the Hartz Re­
forms 
Length of Beneﬁt  Age  Months worked  Length of Beneﬁt  Age  Months worked 
Entitlement  (in years)  in last 7 years  Entitlement  (in years)  in last 3/5 years 
(in months)  (in months) 
Prior to the Hartz Reforms  February 1, 2006 - February 28, 2008 
6  - 12  6  - 12 
8  - 16  8  - 16 
10  - 20  10  - 20 
12  - 24  12  - 24 
14  45 28  15  55  30 
16  45 32  18  58  36 
18  45  36  Since March 1, 2008 
20 47 40  6  - 12 
22 47 44  8  - 16 
24 52 48  10  - 20 
26 52 52  12  - 24 
28  57 56  15  50  30 
30  57 60  18  55  36 
32  57 64  24  58  48 
Source: Social Code III (§117 et seq.) 
(57%/53% replacement rate with/without children) and provided income support 
for unemployed people who had some prior employment experience but had become 
long-term unemployed. In contrast to UB, the UA was granted for an unlimited 
period (as long as individuals were available for the labor market) and funded by 
the Federal budget, i.e., by general taxation. This scheme was also implemented by 
the FEA. Recipients of unemployment assistance in principle had access to similar 
active labor market schemes as UB recipients. This distinction becomes important 
when we discuss the reformed system later on. 
Finally, the social assistance (SA, Sozialhilfe), provided basic income protection 
on a means-tested and ﬂat-rate basis for all German inhabitants. This assistance 
was  independent  of  employment  experience  but  conditional  on  not  having  other 
resources from earned income, other social beneﬁts or family transfers. Therefore, 
social assistance was a safety net for unemployed with either no employment ex­
perience or unemployment beneﬁt/assistance claims that did not match the guar­
anteed minimum income. Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle (2007) 
note that means-testing was harsher in the social assistance scheme (compared to 
the  UA  scheme)  and  every  job  was  considered  acceptable.  Social  assistance  was 
funded by the municipalities that were also responsible for reintegrating recipients 
into the labor market through speciﬁc active measures. A fairly rudimentary labor 
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 market policy—called “Help to Work”—scheme was available and operated by the 
municipalities with a considerable scope of discretion. There was no entitlement to 
integration measures by the Federal Employment Agency (Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, 
and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007) and even if capable of work, many of these needy 
persons were not registered as unemployed with the FEA (Bernhard, Gartner, and 
Stephan, 2008). 
With the beginning of 2005 the Social Code II (SC II, Sozialgesetzbuch II ) came 
into force with some major changes in the system: most importantly, the former un­
employment assistance and social assistance were replaced by a single means-tested 
replacement scheme for needy unemployed job-seekers and their household mem­
bers. The new scheme—unemployment beneﬁt II (UB-II, Arbeitslosengeld II )—is 
tax-ﬁnanced and covers people either in need and able to work but not entitled to 
unemployment beneﬁts—from now on called unemployment beneﬁts I (UB-I, Ar­
beitslosengeld I )—or after UB-I has expired. The amount of UB-II does not depend 
on former income and needy job-seekers and their household members are predom­
inately registered as unemployed and may receive employment services (diﬀerent 
from those for UB-I recipients). For UB-I recipients the most drastic change con­
cerned the duration of beneﬁt entitlement (see Table 2). The maximum duration was 
cut down to 24 months (only available for people aged at least 58 years and having 
worked for at least 48 months in the last ﬁve years before becoming unemployed). 
Initially, the reductions were even sharper before they were loosened again due to 
political unrest. Between February 1, 20064 and February 28, 2008 only two discon­
tinuities were in place: for people aged at least 55 years the maximum duration was 
set to 15 months (with 30 months of employment before) and 18 months (with at 
least 36 months of employment). 
The Hartz reforms (and especially Hartz IV ) radically changed the German sys­
tem of wage-related welfare. The new UB-II scheme has a dual aim: on the one 
hand, it was designed to prevent poverty; on the other it did not secure previous 
living standards. Thus, for those having received social assistance before, the new 
legislation actually allows them to receive marginally more money and access to 
job employment services (Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). 
For former recipients of UA the level of transfer payment decreased. Apart from 
its social policy objective, the aim of this reform was to lower unemployment but 
also to ease the burden of taxation and non-wage labor costs by reducing beneﬁt 
4Even though the SC II came into force in 2005, the changes concerning unemployment beneﬁts 
became eﬀective only on February 1, 2006. 
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 Table 3: The Old and the New Unemployment Beneﬁt System
 
Old System (Until 2004)  New System (Since 2005) 
Arbeitslosengeld  (unemployment insurance beneﬁt): 
funded through contributions, earnings-related, lim­
ited duration 
Arbeitslosengeld I  (UB-I): funded through contribu­
tions, earnings-related, limited duration 
Arbeitslosenhilfe  (earnings-related  unemployment 
assistance):  tax-funded,  earnings-related,  means­
tested, inﬁnite duration 
Grundsicherung (Basic income scheme for needy job­
seeker/ SGB II)) 
Consisting of 
a)  Arbeitslosengeld  II  (UB-II):  tax-funded,  means­
tested, ﬂat rate, after expiry of UB-I (and temporary 
supplement),  inﬁnite  duration  (integration  of  “Ar­
beitslosenhilfe” and “Sozialhilfe” for people capable 
of working) but stronger principle of activation 
b)  Sozialgeld  (social  allowance)  for  kids  below  the 
working age of 15 living in a household of an UB-II 
recipient 
Sozialhilfe  (social  assistance):  taxfunded,  means­
tested, ﬂat rate, inﬁnite duration 
Social assistance: means-tested, tax-funded, ﬂat rate, 
inﬁnite duration (SGB XII) 
Consisting of 
· Grundsicherung fur Erwerbsgeminderte und im Al­
ter: 
for those working age people above 18 years perma­
nently not capable of working and for needy persons 
above 65 years 
· Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt: Help to overcome spe­
cial situations in life (illness, care etc) 
Source: Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle (2007) 
dependency. The major lever to achieve this goal was the shortening of individual 
unemployment spells through accelerated job placement and more coherent activa­
tion of the beneﬁciaries of unemployment insurance beneﬁts and unemployment or 
social assistance. Less generous beneﬁts for long-term unemployed, stricter job suit­
ability criteria and more eﬀective job placement and active labor market schemes 
were the instruments to achieve this goal. Table 3 summarizes the most relevant 
changes (Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). We will discuss 
the “activation” elements of these reforms in Section 3.3. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the organizational structure of labor market 
policies has been changed within the reforms. The administration of the new ser­
vices for needy job-seekers is mostly conducted jointly by the Federal Employment 
Agency and by local municipalities. However, 69 municipalities opted out of this 
cooperation and provide all services for needy job-seekers on their own (Optierende 
Kommunen). This exception was made in order to allow local municipalities more 
discretion in tackling the problem of long-term unemployment. The Public Employ­
10
 ment Services (PES) are now organized in two branches: (1) a tax-funded branch— 
based on the Social Code II—for needy employable job-seekers and their households 
and (2) an insurance-funded branch—based on the Social Code III—for job-seekers 
who receive unemployment beneﬁts I or have not yet qualiﬁed for unemployment 
beneﬁts I (Bernhard, Gartner, and Stephan, 2008). Konle-Seidl (2008) and Stephan 
and Zickert (2008) discuss aspects of the new governance of employment services. 
3.2  Pensions, Early Retirement, and Disability 
Germany  has  one  of  the  most  generous  public  pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO)  pension 
insurance systems of the world providing pensions to all private and public sector 
dependent employees with the exception of civil-servants and self-employed.5 It leads 
to high eﬀective replacement rates and low eﬀective retirement ages. Through a long 
reform process, the system has been gradually updated and we will discuss its key 
elements brieﬂy in this section. One major aspect will be the diﬀerent ways of tran­
sitions into early retirement; B¨ orsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) provide an extensive 
overview of the mentioned issues. 
The public pension system in Germany is often characterized as a three pillar 
scheme: the ﬁrst pillar—the public retirement insurance (PRI, Gesetzliche Renten­
versicherung)— comprises the elements of the core system (old-age pension, disabil­
ity pension and survivor beneﬁts). It is laid down in the Social Code VI (Sozialge­
setzbuch VI ) and covers about 85% of the German work force including those public 
sector workers that are not civil servants. About 70% of the budget of the public 
retirement insurance is ﬁnanced by matching contributions of employers and employ­
ees. In 2009, the mandatory contribution rate amounted to 19.9% of the ﬁrst e5,400 
of the monthly gross income (upper earnings threshold, Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) 
in former West Germany.6 The remaining part of the budget is ﬁnanced by subsidies 
of the federal government (27.8% in 2008). The second pillar includes the occupa­
tional and the subsidized pension scheme. Many companies provide occupational 
pensions (Betriebsrenten) to their employees including: pensions funds (Pensions­
fonds), retirement income insurance (Rentenkassen), direct insurances (Direktver-
sicherungen), direct pension assurances (Pensionszusagen), and benevolent funds 
(Unterst¨ utzungskassen). These forms diﬀer in terms of taxation and possible ways 
of subsidies from the government (see Kortmann, 2008). In 2007, roughly 64% of all 
5Self-employed can voluntarily contribute to the system. 
6In former East Germany, the upper earnings threshold amounts to e4,550 (see Bundesminis­
terium f¨ ur Arbeit und Soziales, 2008, for details). 
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 employees eligible for social security contributions contributed to an occupational 
pension plan. Finally, the third and last pillar contains elements of private pension 
plans, such as portfolios, real assets and private pensions that are not subsidized. 
The average retirement age in 2007 was 60.8 years for men and 60.6 years for 
women in Germany. Even though this constitutes an increase of 1.5 years for men 
and 0.4 years for women compared to the average retirement age in 1998 (Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund, 2008), it still lies well below the current statutory retire­
ment age of 65 years. Furthermore, as consequence of the demographic change to­
wards an ageing society, the old-age dependency ratio is increasing steeply.7 Clearly, 
this is seriously threatening the German PAYGO pension system (along with the 
negative eﬀects of early retirement) because fewer workers have to ﬁnance the bene­
ﬁts of more recipients. Recognizing these problems in the early 1990s led to a series 
of reforms between the years 1992 and 2007 which we will describe brieﬂy later on. 
Before we do so, we will discuss the diﬀerent beneﬁt types in the PRI. 
The public insurance system provides old-age pensions for workers aged 60 and 
older, disability pensions for workers below age 60 and survivor beneﬁts for spouses 
and children. Additionally, the system allows for early retirement through diﬀerent 
mechanisms mainly using the public transfer system. Old-age pensions are strictly 
work related, computed by a speciﬁc pension formula on a lifetime basis and ad-
justed  for the  type  of  pension  and  retirement  age.  In terms  of  the beneﬁt  level, 
the old-age pension has long been characterized by a very high replacement rate 
(Nettorentenniveau): a legally deﬁned standard retiree (Eckrentner) at age 65 with 
a 45-year earnings history and average lifetime earnings received about 70% of his 
pre-retirement net income (B¨ orsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004). However, the replace­
ment rate has declined to roughly 68% in 2005 and has become less generous since 
2004 due to changes in the taxation law (Alterseink¨ unftegesetz ). Survivor beneﬁts 
are paid to the surviving spouse in case of death of her husband/his wife if he/she 
had paid mandatory contributions to the pension system for at least ﬁve years. The 
beneﬁt level amounts to 55% of the husband’s/wife’s applicable pension for spouses 
aged 45 years and older or if children live in the household, and 25% otherwise. 
Disability beneﬁts for individuals with limited abilities to work were initially 
ﬁnanced by the Federal Employment Agency as an income replacement bound for 
7This is a measure of the age structure of the population and relates to the number of individuals 
that are likely to be “dependent” on the support of others for their daily living to the number of 
those individuals who are capable of providing such support (OECD, 2006a, p. 42). In Germany, 
the ratio is projected to increase from 0.3 in 2007 to 0.55 through the year 2035 (B¨ orsch-Supan 
and Wilke, 2007, p.7). 
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 medical impairment. As of 2001, there are two possible options. First, people who are 
not capable of working under regular labor market conditions due to health condi­
tions are eligible to a full-beneﬁt pension (Rente wegen voller Erwerbsminderung).8 
They must verify having paid mandatory social security contributions for at least 
three out of the previous ﬁve years. Second, the weaker option applies to individuals 
who are still able to work more than three hours a day (Rente wegen teilweiser Er­
werbsminderung). However, if no vacancies for the worker’s speciﬁc job description 
are available, the ﬁrst option applies (B¨ orsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004, p. 13). After 
reaching the statutory retirement age of 65, the disability pension is converted in 
both cases into the regular old-age pension. Since age was not an entrance require­
ment this pension scheme proved to be an attractive pathway into early retirement 
(Arnds and Bonin, 2002, pp. 18-19). 
In 2005, about 6.7 million people were severely disabled in Germany, which corre­
sponds to 8% of the total population. Labor market participation of people with dis­
abilities is still low; in 2006 the unemployment rate of people with severe disabilities 
amounted to 16.6% (cf. Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit, 2007). To overcome this, there ex­
ists a wide range of rehabilitation and re-training arrangements for disabled people. 
According to the Social Code IX (Sozialgestzbuch IX ), they have the right to claim 
four diﬀerent types of beneﬁts: medical rehabilitation (Leistungen zur medizinischen 
Rehabilitation), work rehabilitation and work assistance (Leistungen zur Teilhabe am 
Arbeitsleben), beneﬁts for securing one’s livelihood (Unterhaltssichernde und andere 
erg¨ anzende  Leistungen), and individual integration support (Eingliederungshilfe). 
Another element that is supposed to encourage labor force participation of disabled 
people is laid down in the second part of Social Code IX (Schwerbehindertenrecht). 
Accordingly, businesses with 20 employees or more are enforced to recruit at least 
5% of their staﬀ from individuals with disabilities. Those businesses who fail to fulﬁl 
their quotas need to pay ﬁnes (Ausgleichsabgaben) for each workplace supposed to 
be occupied by a disabled worker. The Social Code IX also requires that enterprises 
have to adjust their premises in order to suit the needs of disabled workers. Fur­
thermore, it provides legislation which protects the disabled against discrimination 
in recruitment and employment as well as unfair dismissal (Lechner and Vazquez-
Alvarez, 2003). 
The  German  pension  system  allows  for  certain  ways  of  transitions  into  early 
retirement. In general, individuals may retire voluntarily at any time between 63 and 
8The  “capability  of  working”  is  deﬁned  as  being  able  to  work  three  hours  per  day  in  the 
foreseeable future under usual labor market conditions. 
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 the full statutory retirement age which is currently the age of 67 (we will discuss the 
most recent reform later on). As compensation for the longer duration of pension 
payments, however, the pension reform in the late 1990s reduced the pension by 0.3% 
for each month of commencement of the pension before the age of 65 years (Bonin, 
2009). The aggregate pension loss can still be quite substantial given the conditional 
life expectancy of above 15 years at retirement age (Berkel and B¨ orsch-Supan, 2003). 
From 1957 to 2005, the German pension system allowed for transitions into early 
retirement in the case of an unemployment spell of at least one year. The relevance 
of this early retirement scheme had grown steadily, ﬁrst of all mostly because of 
the high and persistent long-term unemployment rate in Germany. Additionally, the 
social policy shift at the beginning of the 1970s aimed at taking surplus labor out 
of the market by active and passive policies contributed to it’s importance (Arnds 
and Bonin, 2002). Today, this pathway to early retirement is not possible anymore 
for individuals born after 1952. 
Old-age part-time (Altersteilzeit) constitutes a diﬀerent possibility to reduce la-
bor supply. Individuals, who completed the age of 55 and have been subject to social 
security contributions for at least three out of the previous ﬁve years may: (1) reduce 
their volume of employment by half, receiving a reduced salary from their employer 
or (2) continue working full-time and retire fully but earlier afterwards.9 The latter 
option is know as the “block model” and the general and legal framework of this 
arrangement is laid down in the Old-Age Part-Time Employment Act (Altersteilzeit­
gesetz ). It is subject to regulations within collective bargaining agreements between 
employers and employees. Individuals taking the ﬁrst option of old-age part-time 
receive 70% of their former net wage and the employer contributes to the pension 
system on the basis of 90% of the employee’s full-time employment compensation 
(Arnds and Bonin, 2002, p. 21).10  Since its introduction in 1996, old-age part-time 
schemes have become more and more important. In 2006, men on average entered 
into one of the old-age part-time schemes at age 57.6 (women at 57.0 years). Indi­
9The old-age part-time scheme is usually accompanied by an early entry into retirement since 
individuals may still obtain reduced old-age pensions after completion of their old-age part-time 
arrangement. For the birth cohorts until 1945, a reduced old-age pension is possible starting from 
age 60. However, this retirement age has been gradually lifted to 63 years between 2006 and 2008. 
For birth cohorts 1952 and younger it is not possible anymore to retire before the age 65 within 
the old-age part-time scheme (Wanger, 2009) 
10Since the employee in old-age part-time receives a wage that is (at least) 20% higher than 
the one he would receive for “normal” part-time, the employer “augments” the part-time salary 
by  a  certain  (tax-free)  amount  (Aufstockungsbetrag).  This  amount  is  paid  by  the  FEA  in  case 
the employer hires an unemployed individual or an apprentice in consequence of the part-time 
agreement. 
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 viduals in old-age part-time may still obtain reduced old-age pensions at age 60 if 
they were born before 1945. However, this retirement age had been gradually lifted 
from 60 to 63 between the years 2006 and 2008. Moreover, for the cohorts 1952 
and younger it is not possible anymore to enter the early-retirement scheme due to 
the recent reforms which we will describe now (see Wanger, 2009, for an extensive 
description). 
The ﬁrst element of the 1992 reform was the indexing of pensions to net instead 
of gross wages and salaries. As a result, the beneﬁts have implicitly been reduced due 
to the increase of taxes and social security contributions lowering the net relative to 
gross wages. The second major element was the introduction of an actuarial adjust­
ment for early retirement and a gradual uplift of the statutory retirement age for all 
pension types to 65 years (see B¨ orsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004, for more details). The 
actuarial adjustment for early retirement consisted in a reduction of the pension by 
0.3% for each month of commencement of the pension before the age of 65 years 
as compensation for the longer duration of pension payments (Bonin, 2009). Many 
elements of the 1992 reform were revoked after the change of government in 1998 
and are therefore not discussed here. However, the gradual change of eligibility ages 
from 60 to 65 for women and unemployed individuals was not revoked and even 
accelerated so that it has been already fully implemented by 2005. This basically 
made early-retirement (without reduction) due to part-time schemes and long-term 
unemployment de facto impossible for individuals born after 1952 (Bourcarde, 2006). 
The Riester Reform11 was ratiﬁed in 2001 and was a new pension reform act consti­
tuting a major change in the system by partially substituting the PAYGO ﬁnanced 
pensions by funded pensions. Since January 1, 2002, individuals compulsory insured 
in the PRI may—in addition to the ﬁrst pillar statutory pension scheme—obtain 
supplementary private pensions with capital coverage. These pensions are subsidized 
by the federal government (Riester Rente). Although these supplementary pensions 
are not compulsory they are supposed to counteract the decline in public pensions. 
A second noteworthy element of the reform aimed at stabilizing the contribution 
rates: the indexing of pensions was reversed back to gross wages and the law was 
changed so that the contribution rate is kept below 20% until 2020 and 22% until 
2030 (Social Code VI § 154 (3)). In the 2004  reform  a sustainability factor was 
introduced into the pension adjustment formula (RV-Nachhaltigkeitsgesetz ). This 
factor mainly accounts for demographic changes by considering the ratio between 
pensioners and contributors to the system (Sachverst¨ andigenrat zur Begutachtung 
11The reform was named after the former labor minister Walter Riester. 
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 der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 2004). The last major amendment to the 
pension system took place in 2007. The statutory retirement age of 65 will be grad­
ually lifted to 67 years. In detail, starting from the year 2012 and with the birth 
cohort of 1947 the age limit will be increased by one month per year and birth 
cohort. This means that the birth cohort of 1958 will have to work up to the age 
of 66. The mandatory retirement age of 67 will be reached by the year 2029 for all 
birth cohorts born from 1964 onwards (Bonin, 2009). 
3.3  Active Labor Market Policies and Activation Measures 
Germany has a long tradition in the provision of active labor market policies and 
there exist several ALMP programs supporting the integration of unemployed per­
sons into the labor market (see inter alia Caliendo and Steiner, 2005; Bernhard, 
Hohmeyer, Jozwiak, Koch, Kruppe, Stephan, and Wolﬀ, 2008, for comprehensive 
overviews). However, with the Hartz reforms a shift has been made towards active 
measures that require proactive behavior of the unemployed and promote their direct 
integration into regular employment. Jacobi and Kluve (2007) describe the Hartz 
reforms as a tripartite reform strategy aimed at (1) improving labor market services 
and policy measures in terms of eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency, (2) activating the un­
employed based on the principle of “rights and duties” (F¨ ordern und Fordern) and 
ﬁnally (3) stimulating labor demand by deregulating the labor market. Under the 
ﬁrst category falls the re-organization of local employment oﬃces, giving more dis­
cretion to local oﬃces and introducing market forces in the provision of training and 
other services, e.g., voucher systems for placement services (Vermittlungsgutschein) 
and training measures (Bildungsgutschein). The former is given to individuals who 
could not be placed by the public employment service within six weeks of unemploy­
ment allowing them to choose alternative private placement services. With the latter 
one, individuals can choose between diﬀerent private providers of training measures 
and pay for their services with the voucher. The Public Employment Service is now 
also enabled to outsource services, e.g., placement via temporary work in staﬀ service 
agencies (Personal Service Agentur). Furthermore, an improved targeting of active 
measures and a better allocation of resources were additional aims. This was mainly 
done by proﬁling customers into four types and addressing their needs accordingly. 
Finally, it was also agreed upon to conduct rigourously scientiﬁc evaluations of all 
the measures (see Jacobi and Kluve, 2007, for more detials). 
The second part of the strategy is the most relevant for our analysis here trying 
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 Table 4: Entries in Selected Labor Market Programs (2000-2008, in 1,000)
 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005a  2006a  2007a  2008a 
II  III  II  III  II  III  II  III 
Entries into program 
Wage subsidy  152  127  188  183  157  60  73  105  113  125  123  120  130 
Further vocational training  523  442  455  255  185  65  66  102  144  140  201  196  260 
Public job creation I (ABMs)  318  246  215  179  161  62  16 62  16  50 16 60  6 
Public job creation II (1-Euro-Jobs)  –  –  –  –  –  630  – 741  –  703  – 696 – 
Short-term training  485  551  865  1064  1188  410  483  444  534  480  520  496  587 
Contracting-out placement servicesb  –  –  –  –  635  273  153  149  153  113  121  176  254 
Start-up subsidy  –  –  –  97  171  –  91  –  43c  – – – – 
Bridging allowance  93  96  125  159  184  –  157  –  108d  – 176 –  – 
New start-up subsidy: Soical Code III  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  126  –  119 
New start-up subsidy: Soical Code II  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  32  –  30  –  25  – 
a) Programs covered by Social Code II (without municipalities opting out of the cooperation with the Public Employment Service) and III 
b) Figures are available since 2004, while diﬀerent variants started already in 1998 respectively 2002 
c) Entries from January to July 
d) Entries from January to November 
Source: Federal Employment Agency 
to activate the unemployed and integrate them in the ﬁrst labor market. The new 
policy mix targets explicitly job seekers who want to end their unemployment spell 
in a self-responsible way. To this end, the reform re-designed integration subsidies, 
introduced new forms of wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and jobs with reduced 
social security contributions. Emphasis was shifted away from public job creation 
schemes which have been proven not to be eﬀective (see, e.g., Caliendo, Hujer, and 
Thomsen, 2008b). 
Table 4 contains the number of entries in diﬀerent programs for the years 2000­
2008;  from  2005  onwards  distinguished  by  persons  falling  under  Social  Code  III 
and needy job-seekers under Social Code II. The most important programs covered 
by Social Code III are contracting-out, start-up subsidies, short-term training and 
further vocational training. We are discussing some of these elements in the following 
and provide some preliminary evaluation results in Section 4. The most important 
programs  covered  by  Social  Code  II  are  public  job  creation  schemes  (Hohmeyer 
and Wolﬀ, 2007) and short-term training (Wolﬀ and Jozwiak, 2007). Contracting­
out  placement  services  to  private  providers  (Bernhard  and  Wolﬀ,  2008),  further 
vocational training and targeted wage subsidies are less often used, but are still 
important instruments. 
A good example of the policy shift within the reforms is the introduction of a new 
start-up subsidy. In the years 2003-2006 turning unemployment into self-employment 
became a major focus of German active labour market policy. Whereas the Federal 
Employment Agency funded only 37,000 business start-ups by formerly unemployed 
individuals in 1994, the number reached a peak with above 350,000 entries in 2004. 
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 This increase was driven, among other things, by a new program known as the ‘start­
up subsidy’ (SUS, Existenzgr¨ undungszuschuss), which was directly introduced as 
part of the Hartz reforms. Unemployed individuals could then choose between this 
¨  and a second program, the ‘bridging allowance’ (BA, Uberbr¨ uckungsgeld), which was 
already implemented in the late 1980s. In 2004, 17.2% of ALMP resources were allo­
cated to these measures helping unemployed individuals to end their unemployment 
spell in a proactive behavior. Furthermore, integration into regular employment by 
wage subsidies when hiring hard-to-place workers was also made easier by simpli­
fying the eligibility conditions of integration subsidies. Additionally some elements 
were introduced intending to “make work pay”, e.g., subsidies to social security con­
tributions (SSC) if the job qualiﬁes as a Mini-Job. The main objective of this part 
of the reform was to provide positive work incentives for people with low earnings 
potential by subsidizing social security contributions and allowing unemployed indi­
viduals to top up their beneﬁts (up to 165 Euro per month). Labor income up to 400 
Euro was exempted from employees’ SSC and these jobs were labeled Mini-Job (or 
marginal employment); for earnings between 401 and 800 Euro a degressive subsidy 
was introduced (and henceforth called Midi-Job). This reform included three major 
changes compared to pre-reform regulations. First, the maximum amount for earn­
ings exempted from SSC was increased from 325 to 400 Euro. Second, the previous 
maximum hours restriction (15 hours per week) was abolished. Third, income up to 
400 Euro per month from a mini-job held as a secondary job, which was fully taxable 
before the reform, was now exempted from SSC and income tax. This is in line with 
several European countries introducing in-work beneﬁts, tax credits, or subsidies to 
social security contributions (SSC) for working individuals. Examples are the Work­
ing Family Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK (see, e.g., Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, 
and Meghir, 2000) and the French Prime Pour l’Emploi (see, e.g., Stancanelli, 2005). 
Finally, the Hartz reforms also introduced sanction elements in order to eﬀectively 
monitor the unemployed’s search activities and personal eﬀorts to return into the 
regular labor market. Any oﬀer of suitable work needs to be accepted where the def­
inition of suitable work was broadened. Furthermore, beneﬁt receipt is tied to the 
availability for work and program participation. As part of the closer monitoring 
process, individual action plans (Eingliederungsvereinbarung) were introduced, too. 
These plans result from the proﬁling process of the unemployed, listing the services 
that will be provided to the job-seeker as well as the job-seeker’s obligation towards 
the employment agency, e.g., in terms of job search activities and participation in la-
bor market programs. If the unemployed individual does not comply with this plan, 
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 she can be threatened with sanctions in the form of temporary beneﬁt reductions 
(Jacobi and Kluve, 2007). The Social Code II also emphasizes activation policies. 
One of these policies is a workfare program, which was implemented at a large scale: 
the work opportunity program in which participants receive their unemployment 
beneﬁt II and additionally one to two Euros per hour worked (called One-Euro-
Job, see Hohmeyer and Wolﬀ, 2007, for an extensive discussion). One-Euro-Jobs are 
designed for employable needy persons aged between 15 and 64 years. Since they 
are subordinate to regular employment, vocational training and other active labor 
market programs, they can be seen as a measure of last resort. That given, spe­
ciﬁc target groups for this program are hard-to-place unemployed or those who are 
distant to the labor market. One-Euro-Jobs should enhance employability as well 
as reemployment chances. Another application of this program is the usage as a 
willingness-to-work test where no speciﬁc target group is deﬁned and unemployed 
with rather good labor market chances are also likely to participate (Hohmeyer and 
Jozwiak, 2008). The tasks carried out in One-Euro-Jobs have to be of public utility 
and additional in the sense that they would not be completed without the subsidy. 
In many dimensions the design of this program is similar to classical job-creation 
schemes which have been heavily used in the 1990s and early 2000s. There have been 
many studies evaluating the eﬀects of job-creation schemes; ﬁnding mainly negative 
or at best insigniﬁcant eﬀects for participating individuals (see, inter alia, Caliendo, 
Hujer, and Thomsen, 2008a,b). We will brieﬂy present some ﬁrst evaluation results 
for the One-Euro-Jobs in Section 4. 
3.4  Parental Leave Beneﬁt 
Germany is known to have one of the lowest fertility rates among Western Euro­
pean countries and there is not much hope to expect a substantial increase over 
the current rate of 1.4 any time soon (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2006). Moreover, the 
labor force participation of mothers with young children in Germany is very low 
compared to other EU member states (cf. OECD, 2006b). Although these trends 
have been observed during the last decades, the German public has only recently 
begun discussing these issues. The underlying reasons for this unfortunate mix—low 
fertility and low participation—can be seen as a result of a combination of various 
institutional arrangements preventing mothers from working full-time, e.g., missing 
child-care facilities, and rather strong and persistent preferences of (West-)German 
parents to give care to young children at home (Bonin, 2009). Additionally, one 
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 should note that young mothers’ labor force participation crucially depends on the 
child’s age: whereas only one third of the mothers with a child under three years 
of age were employed in Germany in 2005 (33%) already more than half of those 
having a child aged 3-5 years actively participated in the labor force (56%). The 
highest employment rate of 71% was achieved by mothers with children aged 10-14 
years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005). In order to reverse these trends, the German 
government passed a reform of the parental leave beneﬁt system (PLB, Elterngeld) 
in line with the Scandinavian model. The core piece of the reform is the replacement 
of the existing means-tested parental leave beneﬁt by a wage-dependent beneﬁt for 
the period of one year (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2006). The PLB came into eﬀect in 2007 
and replaced the means-tested preceding beneﬁt (Erziehungsgeld). It is provided for 
up to 14 months to parents of children born on January 1, 2007 or later.12  The 
beneﬁt replaces 67% of the average net income earned in the 12 months prior to the 
birth of the child for the parent staying at home.13 The parent is eligible for beneﬁt 
if he or she does not work full-time, which is deﬁned as 30 hours per week. Besides 
the aim of increasing labor market participation of mothers with young children 
and fostering involvement in child care of fathers, the reform explicitly intended to 
increase fertility rates (Tamm, 2009). 
In 2009, the PLB was evaluated by the Federal Ministry for Families concerning 
the short-term eﬀects of the introduction of the beneﬁt on employment behavior 
of parents with a new-born child (Bundesministerium f¨ ur Familie, Senioren, Frauen 
und Jugend, 2009, conducted by the RWI). The study was based on a mail survey 
of a sample of parents (N = 1,595) whose child was born in April 2007 and who had 
applied for and received the parental leave beneﬁt. The study ﬁnds that the majority 
of young mothers resumed employment after having received parental leave beneﬁt. 
In detail, about 13% of all women took up part-time work again after 6 months. 12 
months after the child’s birth one third of all young mothers (31%) were already re­
employed. After 18 months the share added up to 39% reaching 42% after 24 months. 
However, two third of the women state that the infrastructure of child care services 
is insuﬃcient in their region (Bundesministerium f¨ ur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und 
Jugend, 2009, p. 44). Along with the request of better in-ﬁrm child care possibilities, 
these results indicate that the parental leave beneﬁt only develops its full impact 
in  combination  with  better  early  child  care  services  and  more  ﬂexible  models  of 
working hours for women. 
12§ 4(1) Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit (BEEG).
 
13The monthly beneﬁt ranges from e300 for low-income parents up to a maximum rate of e1,800.
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 3.5  Income Splitting as a Source for Reduced Labor Supply 
The number of hours worked by employed persons in Germany is comparatively 
low by international standards. This is mainly due to a high share of secondary­
earners (most often women) working only part-time with very few hours (OECD, 
2008). It is often argued that the current system of income taxation creates ﬁscal 
disincentives for secondary earners because Germany allows for “income splitting” 
between married partners (Ehegattensplitting, § 32a (5) Einkommensteuergesetz ). 
The taxable income of both spouses is cumulated and the sum is then split in half. 
The income tax is calculated by applying the tax function to the resulting amount 
and doubled in a third step to determine the tax liability of the couple. As a result, 
the amount of the income tax of a married couple may be lower than the tax the 
same couple would have to pay if both spouses were taxed individually according 
to  the  principle  of  separate  taxation  (Schlick,  2005).  This  results  in  a  “splitting 
eﬀect”  and  is  seen  by  critics  as  a  main  reason  for  the  relatively  low  labor  force 
participation rate of married women in Germany. The secondary earner has to earn 
enough to oﬀset the marriage gain, which is caused by the “splitting eﬀect”, before 
she contributes to family income and marginal earnings of the second wage earner 
are hit by a high tax rate (Gustafsson, 1992).14 
Therefore, moving to a system of individual taxation has been occasionally pro­
posed by experts (OECD, 2008, p. 76). Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) use a microsimu­
lation model to estimate potential labour supply eﬀects of a shift from joint taxation 
to individual taxation. The authors ﬁnd that the female participation rate would 
increase by around 4.85 percentage points and the total number of hours worked by 
women would rise by 11.40%. However, many public ﬁnance experts maintain the 
contrary by considering that there is no marriage gain from joint taxation at all. 
They rather argue that joint taxation is a logical consequence of the progressive tax 
system in Germany given the normative rule that taxation should be neutral with 
respect to the distribution of incomes within the household (Schlick, 2005, p. 319). 
Moreover, taxing persons on a purely individual basis may come into conﬂict with 
the constitutional law in Germany.15 
In a recent paper Dearing, Hofer, Lietz, Winter-Ebmer, and Wrohlich (2007) 
14As soon as the wife starts contributing to the family income, the “splitting eﬀect” becomes 
smaller. The more she contributes the smaller is the gain from joint taxation compared to a non­
married couple. The marginal tax rate on second-earners is therefore higher than for singles. 
15In  1957,  the  German  constitutional  court  (BVerfGE,  Bundesverfassungsgericht)  ruled  that 
married couples should not be disadvantaged relative to non-married couples and that an equal 
share of the total household earnings belongs to each person in a marriage (BVerfGE 6, 55). 
21
 compare two countries—Austria and Germany—in terms of work incentives created 
by the tax and transfer system and childcare institutions. Both countries are quite 
similar in many institutional aspects but diﬀer in their detailed characteristics con­
cerning the tax system: while in Germany married spouses are taxed jointly and 
are eligible for full income splitting, Austria has a system of individual taxation. 
Moreover, Austria has a much more generous parental leave beneﬁt system. Hence, 
it is interesting to note that labor force participation rates of mothers in Austria and 
Germany are similar; however, full-time employment rates are much higher among 
Austrian mothers. In order to ﬁgure out to what extent these diﬀerences can be 
attributed to diﬀerences in the tax-transfer system, the authors estimate structural 
labor supply models for both countries and then interchange two important institu­
tional characteristics of the two countries: the deﬁnition of the tax unit within the 
personal income tax and the parental leave beneﬁt scheme. The results show that 
diﬀerences in mothers’ employment patterns can partly be explained by the diﬀerent 
tax systems: individual taxation in Austria leads to lower marginal tax rates for sec­
ondary earners and increases labor supply incentives. The authors argue that labor 
force participation of German mothers would rise considerably if Germany would 
introduce Austria’s income tax and parental leave beneﬁt characteristics. 
4  The Eﬀects of the Reforms 
4.1  Evaluation of the Hartz Reforms (up to 2006) 
One of the nice features of the Hartz reforms from a scientiﬁc point of view was the 
implementation of a mandatory evaluation of all the relevant measures. Diﬀerent 
research consortia were involved in analyzing the eﬀects of the three reform tiers: 
(1) improving labor market services and policy measures in terms of eﬀectiveness 
and eﬃciency, (2) activating the unemployed based on the principle of “rights and 
duties” (F¨ ordern und Fordern) and ﬁnally (3) stimulating labor demand by dereg­
ulating the labor market. This allows us to draw on evaluation results based on 
rich individual data which were not available for research in Germany before. We 
will present some selected results for the second tier, a full documentation can be 
found in Bundesregierung (2007); Eichhorst and Zimmermann (2007) and Jacobi 
and Kluve (2007) summarize the results. As already mentioned above, the Hartz 
reforms  involved a shift towards more active measures by redesigning integration 
and wage subsidies, introducing a new start-up subsidy and jobs with reduced social 
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 security contributions. We will present some exemplary evaluation results. 
Table 5: Eﬀects of Hartz Reforms (until 2006) 
Tier/Measure  Evidence  Reform Eﬀect 
before  after 




Assignment  to  private  placement 
providersa  (Beauftragung Dritter) 
n/a 




0  No signiﬁcant eﬀect on re-employment proba­
bility. 
0  No signiﬁcant eﬀect on re-employment proba­
bility. 
–  PSAs  reduce  the  employment  probability  of 
participants . 







+  +  Exit rate into employment increased, locking-
in eﬀects reduced. 
1c.  Public job creation (ABM )  –  (–)  – 
(+) 
Measure remains detrimental after the reform. 
Magnitude of negative eﬀect is decreasing. Im­
pact on “employability” unclear. 
2a.  Wage  subsidies  to  employers 
(Eingliederungszusch¨ usse) 
(+)  +  +  20-50  percentage  points  higher  probabil­
ity  of  regular  employment  post-treatment. 
Extents of windfall gains unclear. 
2b.  Start-up  subsidies 
( ¨  Uberbr¨ uckungsgeld, “Ich-AG”) 
(+)b  +  +  Subsidy  signiﬁcantly  reduces  risk  of 
unemployment  (decreasing  over  time). 
Some windfall beneﬁciaries exist. 
2c.  Employment  with  reduced  social 
security contributions 
Mini-Jobs  n/a  +  + 
(–) 
Reform  caused  large  increase  in  em­
ployees  in  minijobs  (+  1.8  million). 
Inﬂow  from  unemployment  low.  Incidence  of 
intra-enterprise displacement cannot be ruled 
out. 
Midi-Jobs  n/a  (+)  (+) 
(–) 
Modest  eﬀect  on 
of  midijobs 
Incidence  of  intra-enterprise 




3a.  Temporary work deregulation  n/a  +  +  23,700  additional  employees  in  temporary 
work  6  months  after  reform  (short-term). 
Deregulation widely acclaimed. 
3b.  Fixed-term 
workers 
contracts  for  older  n/a  0  0  No signiﬁcant eﬀect. 
Notes:  Labour market eﬀects: + positive, (+) modestly positive, 0 zero, (–) modestly negative, – negative
 
a) Already since early 2002.
 
b) Pre-reform evidence on bridging allowance only.
 
Source: Jacobi and Kluve (2007) 
Jaenichen and Stephan (2007) analyze the eﬀectiveness of targeted wage sub­
sidies, covering a share of labor costs and paid to employers for a ﬁxed period of 
time, for hard-to-place workers, who took up subsidized employment during the sec­
ond quarter of 2002. They concentrate on the subsidy variant for unemployed with 
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 severe problems of reintegration, e.g., long-term unemployed or disabled persons. 
Using propensity-score matching methods they show that wage subsidies may in­
crease the employment prospects of supported workers to a considerable amount. 
For previously unemployed individuals, three years after the start of the program, 
the share in regular employment is 25-42% higher in the treatment group than in 
the matched control group. Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008), Caliendo (2009) and 
Caliendo, K¨ unn, and Wießner (2009) analyze the eﬀects of the two available start-
up subsidies helping unemployed workers to become entrepreneurs. They base their 
analysis  on  administrative  and  survey  data  and  follow  individuals  for  up  to  ﬁve 
years after the start of the subsidy. Given the relatively stable participant structure 
in the BA program since the introduction of the SUS one can argue that the SUS 
attracts a diﬀerent ‘clientele’ for self-employment (see Caliendo and Kritikos, 2009, 
for more details on that). In general it can be stated that participants in SUS are 
less qualiﬁed (when compared to BA participants), and that this program is more 
frequently used by women. Using a conditional diﬀerence-and-diﬀerences estimator 
the authors estimate the eﬀectiveness of both programs relative to nonparticipation. 
The results indicate that both programs are successful: the unemployment rate of 
participants at the end of the observation period is considerably lower, the proba­
bility of being in self-employment and/or paid employment as well as the personal 
income is higher for participants. Rinne, Uhlendorﬀ, and Zhao (2008) study the role 
of training vouchers and caseworkers in public training programs. They use a rich 
administrative data set and apply matching and regression methods to measure the 
eﬀect of the introduction of the training vouchers and more selective criteria on par­
ticipants (which was also part of the Hartz reforms). Besides estimating the overall 
reform eﬀect, they isolate the eﬀect induced by changes in the composition of pro­
gram participants due to stricter selection by the caseworkers (selection eﬀect) from 
the eﬀect based on the introduction of vouchers (voucher eﬀect). They ﬁnd a slightly 
positive impact of the reform and their decomposition results suggest that the se­
lection eﬀect is, if at all slightly negative, and that the voucher eﬀect increased both 
the employment probability and earnings of the participants. RWI et. al (2005) an­
alyze the eﬀects of the introduction of Mini- and Midi-Jobs from a macroeconomic 
perspective. They show that the introduction of both types of jobs introduced a 
signiﬁcant increase in the number of employees in this income range. However, the 
largest part of this increase is due to re-deﬁnitions (caused by the altered threshold 
from 325 to 400 Euro) and secondary jobs, i.e., where individuals already in regular 
employment take up a Mini-Job as secondary employment. Moreover, the incidence 
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 of intra-enterprize displacement cannot be ruled out. Caliendo and Wrohlich (2010) 
use a natural experiment to analyze the eﬀects of the Mini-Job  reform on labor 
supply and do not ﬁnd positive results on overall labor supply either; exceptions are 
students and secondary job holders. Hence, this part of the reform does not seem to 
have been overly successful. 
Table 5 ist taken from Jacobi and Kluve (2007) and summarizes the evaluation 
results with respect to the diﬀerent tiers. In addition, the authors also distinguish 
between pre- and post-reform evaluation results. For most of the instruments and 
initiatives  no  pre-reform  results  are  available,  either  because  the  instrument  has 
been newly introduced or because the previously available data were not suﬃcient. 
Several new measures—like placement vouchers or contracting out—do not display 
signiﬁcant eﬀects, some traditional measures like training and job creation schemes 
improve due to the reform. For training this is mainly due to the reduced locking-in 
eﬀect, for job creation schemes it means that the eﬀects are not as detrimental for 
participants as before. Jacobi and Kluve (2007) conclude that based on the compre­
hensive evaluation of the Hartz reforms involving more than 20 research institutions, 
rich evidence is produced giving the general impression that the eﬀectiveness of mea­
sures has improved modestly. The new strategy with more emphasis on activating 
elements—like start-up or wage subsidies—seems to be a promising policy mix. Since 
the evaluation of the Hartz reforms were all ﬁnished by 2006, the results can only 
be preliminary at most covering medium- but rather only short-term eﬀects. 
4.2  Evaluation of the Hartz Reforms (since 2006) 
The eﬀects of the ﬁnal parts of the Hartz reforms  (and especially Hartz IV ) have 
not been included in the ﬁrst evaluations mentioned above but were part of a sec­
ond large evaluation project which is still ongoing. We are using this subsection 
to present some more recent results on selected elements of the reforms targeted 
at needy job-seekers. Bernhard, Gartner, and Stephan (2008) estimate the average 
eﬀect of targeted wage subsidies paid to employers for a limited period of time on 
the subsequent labor market prospects of participating needy job-seekers (who are 
entitled to UB-II). Based on propensity score matching their results show that wage 
subsidies had in fact large and signiﬁcant favorable eﬀects: 20 months after tak­
ing up a subsidized job, the share of persons in regular employment is nearly 40 
percentage points higher for participants (when compared to nonparticipants). Es-
timated eﬀects on the shares not unemployed and the which is not longer receiving 
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 UB-II are slightly smaller. Wolﬀ and Jozwiak (2007) estimate for a sample of UB-II 
recipients the eﬀects of their participation in short-term training programs. They 
analyze a period shortly after the start of Hartz IV, i.e., just after the reform of 
the means-tested beneﬁt system which aimed at activating employable people in 
needy households was introduced. Short-term training programs intensively target 
such persons. The authors study whether the program has an impact on the regular 
employment rate of the treated and also diﬀerentiate between programs within com­
panies and classroom training. They ﬁnd that the former program which establishes 
a contact to an employer, has a considerable impact on the regular employment 
rate of participants. Both programs tend to be less eﬀective in particular for people 
aged younger than 25 years than for others. This may reﬂect that the programs are 
also a tool to avoid that young adults are registered as unemployed for longer than 
three months. Bernhard and Wolﬀ (2008) analyze the eﬀectiveness of the tempo­
rary assignment of needy job-seekers to private placement services (contracting out) 
with respect to three outcomes: employment, unemployment and beneﬁt receipt. 
They  use  administrative  data  and  apply  propensity  score  matching  to  construct 
the control group. The time period under consideration is a period shortly after 
introduction of UB-II. Since hard-to-place job-seekers usually need more eﬀort to be 
placed into a job it is an interesting question whether groups of people with diﬀerent 
a priori employment probabilities beneﬁt to a diﬀerent extent from an assignment 
to a private placement service. The authors analyze several subgroups separated 
by sex, age, migration background, occupational training and time since the last 
job. Their results suggest that in some cases the assignment to private providers is 
relatively more eﬀective for groups of job-seekers who are rather hard to place. De­
spite positive employment eﬀects for some subgroups, however, their results imply 
that the assignment to private providers is generally ineﬀective and in some sub­
groups counterproductive regarding the goal of avoiding unemployment and beneﬁt 
receipt. Hohmeyer (2009) analyzes the workfare part of the Hartz reforms, i.e., the 
One-Euro-Jobs. With roughly 700,000 means-tested beneﬁt recipients participating 
per year this is a huge program (see again Table 4). Using administrative data for 
participants who entered the program in spring 2005 she investigates medium-term 
eﬀects of the program and the association between ﬂexibility in design and eﬀect het­
erogeneity. First, eﬀects of diﬀerent types of One-Euro-Jobs (according to planned 
duration and weekly working hours) compared to non-participation/waiting are es-
timated  and  second,  program  types  are  compared  directly  by  pairwise  matching 
to disentangle selection and program eﬀects. The results show that lock-in eﬀects 
26
 are larger for participation with a longer planned duration, whereas this is not the 
case for more intensive programs in terms of working hours. In the medium term, 
One-Euro-Jobs do not generally increase the employment prospects for men in East 
Germany beyond two years after program start and longer and more intensive par­
ticipation even decreases employment prospects. In West Germany, One-Euro-Jobs 
in general increase the employment chances and longer participation leads to slightly 
better employment opportunities roughly two years after program start. The initial 
advantage of short participation decreases over time. 
Wolﬀ and Nivorozhkin (2008) study the eﬀect of participation in a new business 
start-up scheme for needy unemployed people in Germany which was also introduced 
at the beginning of 2005. The authors use participants who enter the program be­
tween February and April 2005 and use matching to construct a control group. One 
shortcoming of the data is that they do not provide information on self-employment 
(beyond participation in the program). Therefore, they estimate the impact of pro­
gram participation on the outcomes “neither being registered as unemployed nor 
as a job-seeker” and “no receipt of UB-II”. The estimates imply that even by the 
time when nearly no participant receives the start-up subsidy anymore treatment 
reduces considerably the proportion of registered job-seekers and of means-tested 
beneﬁt recipients among the treated. Moreover, there is no substantial variation of 
these eﬀects over diﬀerent population groups. Schneider (2008) analyzes the eﬀect 
of beneﬁt sanctions on the reservation wage of sanctioned unemployment beneﬁt II 
recipients; where beneﬁt sanctions were tightened with the introduction of UB-II in 
2005. She uses propensity score matching and a survey dataset of UB-II recipients 
in the ﬁrst year after its introduction. For the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect, the study 
relies on rich individual data and the rather unsystematic sanctioning process in the 
starting months after introduction. The timing of the sanction is explicitly consid­
ered by estimating the eﬀects for the ﬁrst four quarters of UB-II receipt in 2005. 
The main result is that there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of sanctions on the reserva­
tion wages of sanctioned UB-II recipients. A side result is that sanctioned UB-II 
recipients were not more likely to be employed at the time of their interview either. 
Both results are robust to various matching estimators, estimation speciﬁcations 
and to the timing of the UB-II sanction. Table 6 summarizes the evaluation results 
of these programs targeted at needy UB-II recipients. Overall, some slightly modest 
short-term eﬀects can be identiﬁed and it will be interesting to examine medium­
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. 4.3	  Ex-Ante Evaluation of Beneﬁt Reforms on Labor Sup­
ply 
In Germany there also exists a large bulk of literature using behavioral microsimu­
lation and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to evaluate the eﬀects of 
tax and transfer reforms before their implementation. These ex-ante evaluations are 
especially useful if diﬀerent reform scenarios need to be judged. Given the complex 
tax and beneﬁt system in Germany, this is not an easy task. While CGE models 
take into account various interdependencies and adjustments on several markets, 
microsimulation models (MSM) usually focus on the household side of the economy. 
However, the latter models allow for more heterogeneity and a more detailed map­
ping of the complex tax-beneﬁt system. Not only “ﬁrst-round” eﬀects (i.e. income 
changes) are calculated, but also behavioral responses of individuals or households 
are taken into account (“second-round” eﬀects). Tax-beneﬁt models with labor sup­
ply responses are the prime example for behavioral microsimulation models (Creedy 
and Duncan, 2006). We are going to brieﬂy describe three studies in this subsection; 
two aimed at analyzing the eﬀects of the Hartz reforms, one looking at the new 
parental leave beneﬁt. 
Arntz et al. (2007) analyze labor supply and redistribution eﬀects of the Hartz 
IV  reforms by using a microsimulation model of the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). In 
terms of income distribution, they ﬁnd a small decline of income inequality within the 
overall population. However, households with high unemployment beneﬁts previous 
to the reform are negatively aﬀected and experience a decline in their income. In 
contrast, households with many children and low income in the status quo were 
declared as “winners” of the reform. Moreover, the study ﬁnds varying labor supply 
eﬀects depending on income loss or gain. Households who experience a decline in 
their income partly compensate their loss with a higher labor force participation. 
The reverse eﬀect applies to households gaining income. Franz et al. (2007) combine 
a MSM with a CGE model to quantify labor supply eﬀects of the introduction of UB­
II. The CGE model incorporates important features of the German labor market in 
which wages are determined by sectoral wage bargaining between labor unions and 
ﬁrms. Their microsimulation results yield overall negative employment eﬀects after 
the introduction of UB-II. Hence, the desirable positive eﬀects of the Hartz IV reform 
can not be veriﬁed ex-ante in their partial equilibrium analysis. Using the CGE 
model they found a decline in gross wages for low-qualiﬁed workers, whereas high­
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 5 
qualiﬁed  workers  experienced  a  slight  increase.  Subsequently,  the  unemployment 
rate decreases for both groups—the decrease being stronger for low-qualiﬁed workers 
since they experienced a reduction in gross wages—and yielded an overall positive 
employment eﬀect. Spiess and Wrohlich (2006) estimate potential implications of 
the PLB using a microsimulation model. The ﬁrst-round eﬀects of their analysis 
indicate that on average couples and single parents in all income groups proﬁt from 
the  reform.  Moreover,  computed  costs  of  the  reform  show  that  the  reform  does 
not appear to be as costly as previously had been asserted in the public debate. 
The results of the behavioral responses (second-round eﬀects) show that the reform 
would not change the participation rate of mothers in the ﬁrst year after the child 
was born. The same result applies to fathers as well. In the second year after the 
child’s birth, however, the model results show a 12% increase in working hours for 
mothers. Furthermore, the participation rate increases from 36% to 39%. In light of 
these results, the authors also mention that the labor market participation of young 
mothers is crucially linked to the provision of child care services. 
Conclusions 
Germany has undergone some major labor market reforms in the last decade. The 
reforms touched the core elements of the labor market, including active and passive 
labor market policies, the organizational structure of the labor oﬃces as well as the 
pension system. As a general goal the reforms were aimed at activating people by 
increasing their incentives to take up work, but also introducing the principle of 
“rights and duties”. The Hartz reforms were initiated in 2001/2002 and the speed 
and depth of the reforms is quite remarkable, especially when having the picture 
of Germany as a “frozen welfare state” in mind. Three reform tiers could be dis­
tinguished: (1) improving labor market services and policy measures in terms of 
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency, (2) activating the unemployed based on the principle 
of  “rights  and  duties”  and  ﬁnally  (3)  stimulating  labor  demand  by  deregulating 
the labor market. Since Germany is also known to have one of the lowest fertility 
rates among Western European countries in combination with a very low labor force 
participation among mothers with young children, an additional reform was intro­
duced in 2007. The core piece of this reform is the replacement of the previously 
existing means-tested parental leave beneﬁt by a wage-dependent beneﬁt for the 
period of one year; accompanied by the provision of more child-care facilities for 
children under three years of age. Most interesting—at least from a scientiﬁc point 
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 of view—is the new tendency in Germany to accompany all the mentioned reforms 
with mandatory evaluations. This allows us now to draw on rich individual data 
and conduct rigorous scientiﬁc evaluations to judge the eﬀects of these reforms. The 
aim of this paper was twofold. First, we gave a brief overview of the most relevant 
income support systems and their recent reforms and second, we discussed evalua­
tion results of the recent reforms where already available. Overall, it is fair to say 
that Germany seems to be on the right track with these reforms. The eﬀectiveness 
and eﬃciency of labor market instruments has been increased and the incentives 
for unemployed individuals to take up work have been improved. While the labor 
market reforms were surrounded by huge political unrest, the reforms concerning the 
pension system have been less controversial, but also quite considerable. What has 
been a one tier system for nearly a century is now (becoming) a multi-pillar system 
where the public insurance only plays a smaller role. The success in both reform 
areas is threatened with the current ﬁnancial crisis. Rising non-wage labor costs will 
hamper employment creation, which in the end, is the missing link for a truly suc­
cessful reform story. The current ﬁnancial crisis will also have a negative impact on 
all pillars of the public retirement insurance, where pensions for current and future 
retirees will be lower compared to the pre-crisis situation (B¨ orsch-Supan, Gasche, 
and Wilke, 2009). Additionally, Germany is currently also tackling the issue of low 
female labor force participation (especially among young mothers). The reform of 
the parental beneﬁt leave aims to increase the labor market participation of parents 
with young children and even though it is too early to draw any conclusions here, 
preliminary results seem promising (Kluve and Tamm, 2009). What is not tackled 
yet, are the disincentives due to the tax system and it is also questionable whether 
this will be approached anytime soon. Looking back at the last decade of reforms 
in Germany one can get the impression that policy makers tend to underestimate 
the political risk associated with reforms and the period needed to generate positive 
results in terms of more jobs and lower unemployment. The reforms implemented 
between 1998 and 2005 have been crucial for the labor market, but caused also sub­
stantial political unrest which ended in a change of government. It remains to be 
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